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Abstract
We analyze the logical foundations of quantum mechanics (QM)
by stressing non-objectivity of quantum observables which is a conse-
quence of the absence of logical atoms in QM. We argue that the mat-
ter of quantum non-objectivity is that, on the one hand, the formalism
of QM constructed as a mathematical theory is self-consistent, but,
on the other hand, quantum phenomena as results of experimenter’s
performances are not self-consistent. This self-inconsistency is an ef-
fect of that the language of QM differs much from the language of
human performances. The first is the language of a mathematical
theory which uses some Aristotelian and Russellian assumptions (e.g.,
the assumption that there are logical atoms). The second language
consists of performative propositions which are self-inconsistent only
from the viewpoint of conventional mathematical theory, but they
satisfy another logic which is non-Aristotelian. Hence, the represen-
tation of quantum reality in linguistic terms may be different: from a
mathematical theory to a logic of performative propositions. To solve
quantum self-inconsistency, we apply the formalism of non-classical
self-referent logics.
keywords: non-objectivity of quantum observables, logical structure of
quantum description, self-inconsistency, self-referent logic, photon existence,
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Grangier-type experiments, coefficient of second order coherence, prequan-
tum classical statistical field theory, Physarum polycephalum
1 Introduction
At many occasions, Niels Bohr repeated that quantum mechanics (QM) does
not yield a description of objective reality; in particular, the values of quan-
tum observables cannot be assigned before measurement (they are not prop-
erties of objects) [1]: “There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract
quantum physical description. It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to
find out how Nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about Nature.”1
Non-objectivity of quantum observables2 has tremendous consequences
for the physical picture of micro-phenomena. It is not easy (if possible at all)
to imagine lawful nature without objective properties of physical systems.
Therefore, the idea that non-objectivity implies that at the microlevel the
universe is totally lawless is a very common consequence of non-objectivity.
Although the interpretation of the quantum universe as the totally lawless
universe is very popular 3, many experts in quantum foundations including
even “quantum orthodoxes”, i.e., those who can not even imagine to go
beyond quantum theory, feel unsatisfactoriness by appealing to the picture
of the lawless universe for so lawful formalism as QM. Unfortunately, the
only way to escape lawlessness is to appeal to quantum nonlocality: to claim
that quantum observables are objective, but there is action at a distance.
At the same time by the aforementioned reason, i.e., unwilling to go beyond
QM, “quantum orthodoxes” do not like Bohmian mechanics. This situation
1As is typical for the Bohr’s writings, the meaning of this statement is not clear. Did
he deny the reality of quantum systems – atoms, electrons, photons? (The discussion in
the present paper is essentially about the nature of photon. Here we remark that initially
Bohr was critical to Einstein’s idea about quanta of the electromagnetic field. However,
after the 1920s he, in fact, accepted Einstein’s idea.)
2Here we have to be very careful with the terminological issue. Bohr definitely did
not consider quantum observables as properties of objects, quantum systems. Thus, from
this point of view they are non-objective. At the same time, since for him measurement
is performed by classical macroscopic devices, the result of measurement is objective as
the output of a classical device. This problem, whether Bohr is for/contra realism, was
analyzed in very detail by A. Plotnitsky, see [2], [3].
3Among the most active advertisers of this picture, we can mention, e.g., Anton
Zeilinger [4], [5], whose theoretical considerations are supported by the incredible ex-
perimental research in quantum foundations. He and Caslav Brukner wrote a series of
papers [6]–[8] on irreducible quantum randomness. (We remark that the idea that quan-
tum randomness differs crucially from classical randomness was discussed already by von
Neumann[9].)
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is definitely self-contradictory.
First of all, we repeat our arguments from [10] supporting non-objectivity
of quantum observables. Theoretically, the origin of non-objectivity was well
explained by Bohr who pointed that the contribution of a measurement de-
vice into the result of measurement is irreducible.4 Moreover, recent exper-
iments on quantum contextuality, see [11], can be definitely interpreted as
supporting non-objectivity of quantum observables; in any event there is no
even a trace of nonlocality. Thus, if one is not really addicted on nonlocality,
one cannot ignore that non-objectivity is the most fundamental feature of
quantum phenomena.
What is the source of non-objectivity? Operationally, as was pointed
by Bohr [1], it is the contribution of a measurement device to the result of
measurement. However, such an operational explanation does not imply the
logical justification of non-objectivity.
In this paper, we argue that the matter of quantum non-objectivity is
that, on the one hand, the formalism of QM constructed as a mathemati-
cal theory is self-consistent, but, on the other hand, quantum phenomena
as results of experimenter’s performances are not self-consistent. This self-
inconsistency is an effect of that the language of QM differs much from the
language of human performances. The first is the language of a mathemat-
ical theory which uses some Aristotelian and Russellian assumptions (e.g.,
the assumption that there are logical atoms). The second language consists
of performative propositions which are self-inconsistent only from the view-
point of conventional mathematical theory, but they satisfy another logic
which is non-Aristotelian. Hence, the representation of quantum reality in
linguistic terms may be different: from a mathematical theory to a logic of
performative propositions. At the level of mathematical theory, we deal with
linguistic terms, satisfying the Aristotelian assumptions. At the level of logic
of experimenter’s performances, we deal with linguistic terms, not satisfying
the Aristotelian assumptions.
Thus, we aim to avoid the “quantum inconsistency” by applying mod-
ern tools of symbolic logic for studying intelligent behavior (performances)
and we will show that the quantum behavior satisfies all the basic proper-
ties of performances. Logical tools for studying human behavior were first
proposed in the 20th-century language philosophy. Notice that in philoso-
phy of language since Ludwig Wittgenstein [12], John Searle [13], and John
Langshaw Austin [14] the ideas of non-objectivity of our everyday reality
4It is very common to speak about irreducible quantum randomness [9], [4]–[8]. How-
ever, it is very difficult, if possible at all, to define irreducible randomness in mathematical
terms.
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have actively developed within the so-called paradigm of linguistic solipsism
(cf. with aforementioned views of Bohr, von Weizsa¨cker, Brukner, Zeilinger).
According to this paradigm, we deal just with linguistic reality if we think or
act and cannot go out of language and return to things themselves. Any fact
is seeable and understandable if and only if this is speakable and the fact can
be described in a language [15]. So, in any thinking we are limited by our
possible speech acts and in any activity by speech interactions. Language is a
part of our behavior and the way we are interacting with others, for example
by commanding, requesting, pleading, joking, debating, etc. Philosophers of
language distinguish performative propositions designating and expressing
our behavior from informative propositions denoting facts. While the infor-
mative propositions are truth-functions of the elementary propositions whose
meanings are presented by facts, therefore they always have references in the
real world, the performative propositions are non-objective in principle, we
cannot find out any real references for them. They are self-referent and their
meanings are just their utterances [12], [14]. In this paper, we will show that
some quantum statements should be considered as performative propositions,
as well.
By emphasizing the role of performative propositions in QM, we can-
not avoid a discussion on the role of free will. We will show that in QM
the problem of free will is involved in considerations – how quantum perfor-
mances can be thought and treated as appropriate performative propositions
for which there are no real references, because they (as well as performative
propositions about human interactions) have a non-objective status.
The logical formalism for studying performative propositions was pro-
posed in [16], [17]. In Physarum Chip Project: Growing Computers From
Slime Mould [18] supported by FP7, we are going to implement this for-
malism among others to build up a programmable amorphous biological
computer. In this computer, logic circuits are presented by programmable
behaviors of Physarum polycephalum. Notice that Physarum polycephalum
is a one-cell organism that behaves according to different stimuli called at-
tractants and repellents and can be considered the basic medium of simple
actions that are intelligent in the human meaning [19]–[24]. This biological
computer has some properties of quantum computer, in particular we can
perform the double-slit experiment for Physarum polycephalum to show that
logical basics of Physarum behaviors are the same as logical basics of quan-
tum behaviors. This means that we face performativity, non-objectivity, and
self-referentiality not only in human interactions, but also in QM [25] and in
the behavior of simplest biological organisms (see also [26] for quantum(-like)
models of gene expression).
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2 Self-inconsistency of verification of quan-
tum mechanics: the principles of comple-
mentarity and individual-collective duality
Typically, discussions on self-inconsistency of QM are based on the principle
of complementarity. We briefly present the most clear analysis of this prob-
lem, complementarity and self-inconsistency of QM, presented by C. Brukner
and A. Zelinger [29]. They pointed that N. Bohr [1] emphasized that “How far
the [quantum] phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation,
the account of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms. The argument is
simply that by the word ‘experiment’ we refer to a situation where we can tell oth-
ers what we have done and what we have learned and that, therefore, the account
of the experimental arrangement and the result of observation must be expressed
in unambiguous language with suitable application of the terminology of classical
physics.” Then, they remarked that rigorously speaking a system is noth-
ing else, than a construct based on a complete list of propositions together
with their truth values. For a quantum system, it can happen that the two
propositions are mutually exclusive. This is a specific case of quantum com-
plementarity. Therefore, in an attempt to describe quantum phenomena we
are unavoidably put in the following situation. On the one hand, the episte-
mological structure applied has to be inherited from the classical physics: the
description of a quantum system has to be represented by the propositions
which are used in the description of a classical system with the Aristotelian
semantics, and, on the other hand, those propositions cannot be assigned to
a quantum system simultaneously. Now, a natural question arises: How to
join these two, seemingly inconsistent, requirements?
In this paper we show that the problem of self-inconsistency of QM is even
deeper, than self-inconsistency implied by the principle of complementarity.
The essence of quantum self-inconsistency can be better characterized by
the principle of the individual-collective duality which can be observed in the
Physarum behaviour as well (for more details about this logic see [16], [17]):
there are no logical atoms and something that seems a logical atom (e.g.,
an individual behavior) is in fact a family of other sets (e.g., a collective
behavior, see section 8).
For example, let us define truth-valuations of QM conventionally, in the
way of Aristotle and Russell:
• (i) the property E is actual (true) in a given state S, whenever a test
of E on any physical object x in S would show that E(x) is true for
every x in the state S;
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• (ii) the property E is nonactual (false) in a given state S whenever a
complementary property ¬E on any physical object x in S would show
that ¬E(x) is true for every x in the state S.
Objects x are interpreted as individuals (logical atoms). Assume that x
mean quanta, E, ¬E properties, discovered in the double-slit experiment,
with the following meanings:
E := “the non-detection of the position of x on the first screen in one of
the two slits and the detection of the position of x on the registration screen
corresponding to the momentum representation with the interference picture”;
¬E := “the detection of the position of x on the first screen in one of the
two slits or the non-detection of the position of x on the registration screen
corresponding to the momentum representation with the interference picture”.
According to the double-slit tests, we face that E(x) and ¬E(x) are true
for the same state S. Obviously, that is self-inconsistent.
But we can deny our assumptions that x are logical atoms, i.e., we can
assume that x are not exclusive individuals. For instance, we can put forward
the following self-referent definition of x: {x} = {a, b}, i.e., x is both a
and b, where a = (b, (a)) and b = (a, (b)), i.e., a = (b(a(b(a(b . . .))))) and
b = (a(b(a(b(a . . .))))) are two mutually depended infinite streams. Let E(a)
be true, ¬E(b) be true, E(b) be false, and ¬E(a) be false. In this case, E(x)
and ¬E(x) are true for the same state S and we cannot logically divide x into
a and b, because x is a simple object, although it is not an individual. In this
paper, we will show, how we can deal with these strange non-Aristotelian
objects logically.
In our paper, we are limited just by an observational language. Notice
that the language of any physical theory consists of two different languages:
a theoretical language (formal theory with axioms and inference rules) and
an observational language (semantics for the theoretical language). The first
language contains theoretical terms, which are understood as expressions that
refer to nonobservable entities or properties. The second language contains
observational terms (observables).
A logic for observables is constructed in the observational language and
a logic for theoretical entities in the theoretical language. In the early 20th
century, there was a philosophical movement of logicism and its followers
claimed that it is possible to construct a general logic for both observables
and theoretical terms. This general logic could be called “logical physics”. It
is a part of logic, where logical properties of terms and propositions in relation
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to space, time, motion, causality, etc. are studied [27]. Usually, logical physics
has been presented by logical tools for reducing propositions with theoretical
entities to propositions with observables. In the accordance with this task,
the theoretical terms are understood as follows: a term t is theoretical if
and only if it holds, for all methods m of determining its extension, that m
rests upon some axioms of some theory T and otherwise it is observational
[28]. For example, in classical mechanics all methods of determining the force
acting upon a particle appeal to some axioms of classical mechanics (CM),
therefore force is a theoretical term for CM. The entity of spatial distance
does not depend upon the Newtonian axioms. Hence, it is an observable of
CM. Thus, the reduction procedure, which eliminates theoretical terms of
an axiomatic theory by means of observables, is considered a set of semantic
rules for interpreting propositions with theoretical terms on propositions with
observables.
In the way proposed by R. Carnap and C.-O. Hempel, we can reduce
theoretical entities by the following schemata: c ⇒ (h ⇒ e), where h is
a proposition in theoretical terms (hypothesis), c and e are propositions in
terms of observables such that c expresses certain observational conditions,
which are satisfied, e presents suitable detecting devices, which then have to
show observable responses.
It was proven that there are ever theoretical terms which cannot be re-
duced to observational terms by any logical schemata. This circumstance
of the existence of irreducible theoretical terms shows the rigorous limits of
logical physics and logicism in physical sciences at all. For example, in QM
there are, first, a formal physical theory formulated in a theoretical language
and, second, its semantics formulated in an observational language describ-
ing quantum experiments. There is also a logical way to reduce theoretical
entities to observables. This way is presented by quantum logic (QL). Its
logical schemas of reduction are as follows:
p, q:= ‘observable o has a value in a Borel set ∆’
and such propositions are represented by closed subspaces of a Hilbert space,
H. The set of all such subspaces forms an ortholattice, L(H), with p ≤ q
defined by ‘p is a subspace of q’. The logical operations of ‘and’, ‘or’, and
‘not’ are modelled respectively by the operations of meet (infimum), join
(supremum) and orthocomplement on L(H). The lattice L(H) is atomistic,
complete, and orthomodular (non-distributive).
So, as we see, another concept of truth is defined in QL and this concept is
radically different from the classical (Aristotelian-Russelian) concept of truth
[30], because the QL schemas of reducing theoretical terms are different a lot
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from the Carnap and Hempel’s classical manner. The main problem of QL
is that even in non-classical means of interpreting QM there are irreducible
theoretical statements. For example, the QM explanations of the double-slit
experiment cannot be directly interpreted in QL. Nevertheless, “quantum log-
ics can be interpreted as a pragmatic language of pragmatically decidable assertive
formulas, which formalize statements about physical systems that are empirically
justified or unjustified in the framework of QM. According to this interpretation,
QL formalizes properties of the metalinguistic concept of empirical justification
within QM rather than properties of a quantum concept of truth” [30], see also
Garola et al. [31],[32] and Rosinger [33]. The Garola’s pragmatic extension of
QL allows him to define justifications of theoretical statements which cannot
be reduced directly, e.g., within this extension it is possible to justify the QM
explanations of the double-slit experiment. We can remember that the irre-
ducibility of theoretic entities can imply even scientific anarchism: “Science
is an essentially anarchic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian
and more likely to encourage progress than its law-and-order alternatives” [34].
Therefore, the pragmatic approach can explicate many presuppositions of
quantum physicists and their way of reasoning as one of the possible ways.
Our approach to QL is different from the conventional QL with proposi-
tions defined on members of L(H) and the Garola’s pragmatic extension of
this QL. First of all, we would like to follow the pure logicism that has been re-
animated by unconventional computing recently. In unconventional comput-
ing, we appeal to the following schemata of logical reductions: I ⇒ (h⇒ O),
where h is a theoretical proposition, I are inputs of an unconventional com-
puter (quantum computer, DNA-computer, Physarum polycephalum com-
puter, etc.) and O are outputs of this computer. In these schemata, h is
interpreted as a processor of suitable unconventional computer.
Unconventional computing is not so ambitious as physical theories such
as QM. This new approach to computations completely ignores theoretical
entities if they cannot be applied in designing an appropriate unconventional
(abstract or real) processor. Hence, it deals just with reducible theoretical
terms. In our research, we found out that the behavioral logic constructed on
the observables of Physarum polycephalum and parasites of Schistosomatidae
(Trematoda: Digenea) can be directly applied in the double-slit experiment
with quanta. The basic idea of this behavioral logic is in the individual-
collective dualism that there are no logical atoms in behaviors. Notice that
logical theories for unconventional computing are always constructed in an
observational language. In our opinion, the propagation of photons has some
similarities with an intelligent propagation of Physarum polycephalum [22],
parasites of Schistosomatidae (Trematoda: Digenea) [23], and may other
living organisms. Perhaps, we can claim about a new version of pantheism
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and idealism that the same patterns of intelligent behaviors are observed
everywhere – from quanta to one-cell organisms and human beings.
3 Self-inconsistency of verification of theoret-
ical viewpoints on photon
Quantum optics (as a theoretical formalism) is based on the well-defined
and self-consistent notion of photon. In order to couple the theory with ex-
periments (i.e., to verify theoretical terms, to reduce them to observables),
we need an operational definition of photon which can be coupled to its
theoretical definition – as an excitation of quantum electromagnetic field.
Operationally, we can define photon as a click of a photo-detector (e.g., A.
Zelinger, A. Migdall, S. Polyakov, private discussions). The main point of
our discussion is that such a notion is not self-consistent in the Aristotelian-
Russellian meaning (it has no sense in their semantics). Although nobody
did tell about self-inconsistency of the photon-click definition, the problem
is known (in other terms) and it can be called the problem of the existence
of photon. In other words, it is the problem of verifying our theoretical view-
points on photon. The basic experiment on the “existence of photon” was
performed by Grangier [35],[36], see [37] for reviews on the present experi-
mental situation; see also [38]–[41] for related experimental studies.5
The ideal experiment can be described as follows. There is a single photon
source, beam splitter and two detectors, in each channel of splitter. If “pho-
tons really exist”, i.e., quantum electromagnetic field cannot be represented
as a classical electromagnetic wave continuously propagating in space-time,
then only one of two detectors has to click. This click can be identified with
the presence of photon in this concrete detector.
We remark that this experiment is a special realization of the two slit
experiment in “particle context”, i.e., the experiment in which both slits are
open, but two detectors are in work: one behind each slit. The claim that
only one of these detectors clicks (for a single photon source) was considered
by Bohr as justification of the principle of complementarity – in combina-
tion with the experiment in which both slits are also open, but without the
detectors behind the slits. The later experiment represents the wave-like in-
terference behavior. Thus, the Grangier type experiment on the “existence
5Formally, the aim of such experiments is to show an experimental incompatibility
of semiclassical optics with quantum optics. However, from the foundational viewpoint
experimenters really confront the problem of the existence of photon. The classical wave
can be split by beam splitter, but photon not. Hence, by checking such a splitting one
compares the classical electromagnetic field model with the quantum systems model.
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of photon” is of the fundamental value for quantum foundations. We shall
propose a new interpretation of the experiments of such type.
We point to the well-accepted experimental fact that one can never expect
that the coincidence clicks (i.e., happening simultaneously in both detectors)
will never occur. There are always the coincidence clicks and there are many
such clicks. Therefore it was decided to count not the absolute number of
coincidence clicks, but the relative number which is given by the coefficient
of second order coherence g(2)(0); the number of coincidences divided by the
product of numbers of singles (i.e., at each of detectors). In principle, one is
fine by getting that g(2)(0) < 1. Such a result was used to reject semiclassical
field theories. However, in real experiments g(2)(0) is still relatively large (see
sections 7, 9 for details) and the claim that photon exists, in the operational
sense as the click of a detector, is not justified.
In such a situation, the operational (and hence experimentally verifiable)
notion of photon cannot be considered as self-consistent. Any pair of coinci-
dence clicks, for detectors D1 andD2, can be interpreted as that two mutually
complementary events, A1, photon in D1, and A2, photon in D2, happened
simultaneously. However, logically A1 is negation of A2. Thus, at the level
of the real phenomena, the theoretical term ‘photon’ of QM is not verified,
moreover it is self-inconsistent on observables. In our opinion, a possible
explanation is that the observables for the photon notion are subordinated
to performative regularities of some behavioral entities. And appropriate
propositions in observational terms are not factual, but performative.
Hence, it would be better simply to recognize this fundamental self-
inconsistency and irreducibility of some theoretical terms on the observables
if we appeal to conventional logic and to try to proceed towards development
of a new quantum theory which would not be based on the conventional
logical tools, including classical QL. The modern development of informa-
tion and computer science provides such a possibility. However, in the 1920s
self-consistency of a mathematical theory in the meaning of classical logic
was a fundamental requirement. Therefore, the self-consistent mathematical
theory was created to describe physical phenomena, even if there is no way
to reduce theoretical terms self-consistently. Heuristically, self-consistency
can be considered as a sign of objectivity, a quantum event is either firmly
true or false. Obviously, then, as Bohr pointed out, this is only objectivity of
observed phenomena within verifications of a physical theory, i.e., not “real
objectivity” which was discussed in the Introduction. Nevertheless, in this
situation heuristically one wants to have some “elements of reality”. In our
opinion, the self-consistency of the QM formalism is a main source of the
permanent psychological drama in quantum foundations: reflections towards
objectivity (in various forms, including nonlocal realism which is rather pop-
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ular nowadays).
We can summarize the discussion of this section as follows: Some ex-
periments on the photon existence and on the irreducible deviation of the
coefficient of second order coherence from zero have demonstrated that the
operational notion of photon is not self-consistent on observables. This cir-
cumstance suggests us to construct a new mathematical formalism for quan-
tum phenomena, which would be based on a logical system permitting behav-
ioral entities which are performative and self-referent. Usage of the present
mathematical formalism of QM (which is self-consistent) will permanently
induce the illusion of a possibility of objective interpretation of QM.
4 Non-objectivity from the viewpoint of self-
inconsistency on observables
Let us consider the measurement of photon’s polarization. Suppose that
polarization is the objective property of photon. Thus, the result of the
polarization measurement coincides with this objective property which was
predetermined before measurement. However, the presence of the coincidence
clicks and the corresponding self-inconsistency of the definition of polariza-
tions up and down, for the setting θ of the polarization beam splitter, puts
a statistical constraint on this objectivity. Let us consider representation of
the quantum state Ψ used for measurement by an ensemble of systems which
is denoted by Ω. For the setting θ, let us denote the ensemble of systems (a
subensemble of Ω) producing the coincidence clicks by the symbol Ωθ. Hence,
the self-consistent definition of the property of polarization in the direction
θ is possible only on the subensemble Ω¯θ = Ω \ Ωθ = {ω ∈ Ω : ω 6∈ Ωθ}, the
complement to Ωθ. Therefore, the vector of polarization can be objectively
(and consistently) defined only on the subensemble Ω˜ ≡ Ω \
⋃
θ Ωθ =
⋂
θ Ω¯θ.
Of course, for each fixed θ, the probability of the coincidence clicks is very
small, P (Ωθ) = ǫ << 1.
6 However, the probability of the union
⋃
θ Ωθ can be
close to one. (In the complementary terms, although P (Ω¯θ) ≈ 1, it can hap-
pen that the probability P (Ω˜) = P (
⋂
θ Ω¯θ) ≈ 0.) Thus, the self-inconsistency
of polarization’s observable in the form of the presence of coincidence clicks
can restrict the possibility of the objective definition of polarization to a very
small subensemble of systems prepared in the state Ψ.
The logical possibility that the “objectification subensemble” Ω˜, can have
6We emphasize that in any real experimental setup, although this probability is small,
it has nonzero low bound: P (Ωθ) ≥ ǫmin > 0, see sections 7, 9.
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approximately zero probability7, makes the project of objectification of quan-
tum observables questionable. In the light of the previous consideration, the
appearance of non-objectivity in QM is not so surprising. Hence, if one has
doubts in quantum non-objectivity, he has to find strong reasons for this.
However, in principle, to the question of objectification we need not pro-
ceed under the aforementioned assumption that elements of
⋃
θ Ωθ form a
representative sample (or in complementary terms that the objectification
subensemble Ω˜ is a non-representative sample). In order to destroy objec-
tification, it is sufficient to use the experimentally justified assumption that
the probability of each Ωθ is sufficiently far from zero: P (Ωθ) = ǫ, where
one can take ǫ ≈ 0, 03 for sources producing photons on demand, see sec-
tion 9. In such a situation, we cannot proceed with objective polarization,
simply because we do not know whether for the coming trial the result will
self-consistent or not. We may get a single click in one of channels, but we
also may get coincidence clicks.
We may summarize the results of our analysis of the inter-relation of (non-
)objectivity of quantum observables and their self-(in)consistency from the
classical viewpoint in the follofing way: The self-inconsistency of reducing
theoretical entities of QM to performative descriptions of quantum ob-
servables makes really impossible the objectification of QM observables. (The
procedure of objectification with some probability definitely contradicts to the
standard views on objective reality.)
5 Self-inconsistency contra elements of real-
ity of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen
The Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) argument based on the consid-
eration of elements of reality corresponding to quantum observables mea-
sured for some specially prepared states [42] (which are nowadays known
as entangled states) is one of the strongest motivations for attempts of the
objective interpretation of quantum observables. For example, in his con-
siderations leading to Bell’s inequality, Bell pointed that there is the strong
reason to consider quantum observables as objective, precisely because of
the EPR-argument [43]. The EPR-derivation of the possibility to assign to
quantum systems in some states the objective values of two incompatible
quantum observables was criticized in [45] from the viewpoint of usage of
Lu¨ders projection postulate in the case of observables with degenerate spec-
7To be more rigorous, one has to speak about the probability to draw a system from
the objectification subensemble Ω˜.
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trum, instead of the von Neumann original postulate. Now, we try to destroy
the EPR-argument by using self-inconsistency argument of performances on
observables.
Again, as in section 4, we can decrease the probability of objectification
in the EPR-experiment by considering families of incompatible quantum ob-
servables. However, as was pointed in the previous section, for our purpose we
need not proceed in such a way. Even for the fixed observable, we cannot pre-
dict, whether the result of the coming trial would permit the objectification
or not. (Here we discuss the quantum optics version of the EPR-experiment,
in which the projections of the photon polarization on different axes play the
role of the original EPR-observables, position and momentum.)
The latter argument shows that the essence of the objectification problem
is not in the presence of incompatible quantum observables.
Now in the light of our approach, we can remember the Bohr’s reply
to the EPR-argument [47]. Bohr stressed that even for one fixed setting
one is not able to assign the element of reality to the first component of a
compound system on the basis of the result of measurement on the second
component. Thus, he also pointed that the problem arose already in the case
of a single observable. His conclusion matches very well with our conclusion
(although Bohr did not paid attention to self-inconsistency of theoretical
terms on quantum observables).
6 Free will (performativity) against self-incon-
sistency
Various “technicalities” (see, e.g., the discussion below) play important roles
in quantum experiments. These technicalities are not presented in the math-
ematical formalism of QM. Therefore, the real outputs of experiments deviate
from the theoretical predictions based on straightforward mathematical com-
putations. Taking these technicalities into account is a difficult problem. (In
fact, it can be treated as a part of the quantum measurement problem.) Nev-
ertheless, we can pay attention that some basic elements of these technical
issues of the design of concrete experiments can be considered self-referent
performative propositions. We illustrate this situation by consideration of
quantum optics experiments.
All quantum optics measurements are fundamentally based on the proper
choice of the discrimination threshold. It is a kind of performance that al-
lows us to understand quantum phenomena. For our argument, it is very
important to remark that the setting of the sufficiently high discrimination
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threshold is an important part of experiments on “photon existence”, other-
wise the g(2)(0) coefficient would be too large; see the Grangier’s PhD-thesis
[35]: “[...] In this configuration, the threshold has a double role of acquisition
of timing information and of selection of the pulses (the too weak pulses are
not taken into account). [...] We have in the present experiment chosen a
rather high threshold, which amount to give the priority of the stability
of the counting rates and the reproducibility of the results, rather than to
the global detection efficiencies.” (We stressed with bold the important fact
that Grangier proceeded with rather high threshold.) Thus, in our terms
the selection of the discrimination threshold plays the fundamental role in
minimization of self-inconsistency of reductions to quantum observables.
Evidently, the standard interpretation of this choice of the discrimination
threshold is that this is the noise minimization procedure. However, if one
uses the operational definition of photon as a click of a detector, i.e., if one
studies the real quantum phenomena and not just theorizing, then there is
a problem of separation of “noisy photons” from “real photons”, since both
types are just clicks of detectors.
By putting the discrimination threshold, we insert a subjective element
in all quantum optics measurement schemes. This insertion is based on
our free will – to minimize self-inconsistency of QM (more concretely, self-
inconsistency of the operational definition of photon as detector’s click) by
appropriate performances. This is a complex psychological play. First, the
scientists created a self-consistent mathematical representation of quantum
phenomena. Then, they confronted the problem of coupling of theory with
experiments. This is really a shadowed area of QM. One would not find so
much material on coupling of theoretical entities of QM with real experiments.
Typically, one is completely fine by repeating the Bohr’s statement that in
some experimental contexts photons exhibit particle features. What is the
experimental reality to be a particle, for photon? It seems that this important
problem is practically ignored in theoretical studies on quantum foundations.
However, experimenters have to solve this problem in everyday life. They do
not discuss it in the papers presenting results of experiments, and majority
simply ignores it. However, foundation-thinking experimenters understand
the importance of this problem and each of them solves it for himself; and
surprisingly, the solution is the same: experimentally, photon is nothing else
than the detector’s click. However, by our interpretation experiments (of
Grangier’s type) showed that this operational definition of photon is not self-
consistent within classical QL. Again by our interpretation, an experimenter
minimizes self-inconsistency with the aid of his free will.
Of course, if one considers free will as just a mental illusion and uses
the picture of the totally deterministic universe, see K. Svozil [48] for the
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detailed analysis of such a position, also cf. G.‘t Hooft [49], then nature by
itself minimizes self-inconsistency in the quantum phenomena. However, our
analysis showed that even nature would not be able beat self-inconsistency
completely: it has to respect the statistical constraint based on the presence
of the coincidence clicks.
We also point to usage of another subjective element in minimizing self-
inconsistency of coupling of quantum observables (as elements of the mathe-
matical model of quantum mechanics) with real experiment. This is selection
of the time window for identification of the clicks in the two channels of a
beam splitter as the coincidence clicks. The coefficient g(2)(0) fundamentally
depends on this time window. Here again free will plays an important role.
This is a performance type element of QM. The size of the time window is
determined subjectively aiming to reproduce predictions of the QM mathe-
matical model. We remark that the role of a proper selection of time window
was discussed in very details in connection with the Bell type tests, see [50]–
[52], [45]. This is well known coincidence time loophole for these test. In this
paper, we point out that the same problem arises not only in experiments
with entangled photons, but even in single photon experiments.
In general without subjective determination of “technicalities” such as
thresholds and time widows, an experimenter is not able to approach even
approximately matching with the QM theoretical formalism. Notice that
these “technicalities” are not elements of mathematical formalism of QM.
We could summarize the discussion on free will, performativity, and self-
(in)consistency of QM as follows: Experimenter’s free will plays the crucial
role in the improvement of self-inconsistency of quantum observables. Se-
lections of proper values of various “experimental technicalities” can be in-
terpreted as attempting to lower self-inconsistency of QM presented in usage
of performance type statements in establishing coupling between theory and
experiment. Not doing it intentionally, experimenters construct performative
propositions for which there is another, non-Aristotelian logic.
7 Experiments on “photon existence”
It is well known that photomultipliers and silicon-avalanche-photodiodes have
low efficiency: an essential part of the ensemble Ω of quantum systems rep-
resenting some quantum state, say Ψ, disappears without any click. The
presence of the “no-detection” event also contributes to self-inconsistency
of theoretical terms on quantum physical phenomena. For some setting θ,
the two events, A1 – “polarization up” and A2 – “polarization down”, are
considered as complementary and appearance of the third even, A3 – “no
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detection”, destroys self-consistency on quantum observations, even in the
absence of coincidence clicks. Therefore, from the very beginning we have
considered the experiments on “photon existence”, on estimation of the co-
efficient of second order coherence, which were done with detectors of low
efficiency as just dimming the problem of self-(in)consistency of quantum
entities due to the presence of the coincidence clicks.
We are interested in experiments of the aforementioned type for detectors
of very high efficiency, for TES-detectors. Theoretically they have 100%
efficiency.
However, the main problem is even not in the detectors inefficiency. The
main problem is that in reality there are no pure single photon sources:
“An ideal single-photon source would be one for which: a single photon
can be emitted at any arbitrary time defined by the user (i.e., the source is
deterministic, or “on-demand”), the probability of emitting a single photon is
100%, the probability of multiple-photon emission is 0%, subsequent emitted
photons are indistinguishable, and the repetition rate is arbitrarily fast (lim-
ited only by the temporal duration of the single-photon pulses, perhaps),”
see [40].
Although in literature one may read about single photon sources, this
is merely a terminological trick. There is a fundamental limit of “single
photonity”: if the temperature is higher than zero (Kelvin), then in principle
a black body which is always present in the experimental setup can radiate
a photon in the prepared mode. In optics such a probability (for the room
temperature) is very small, but it is, nevertheless, nonzero. To the most part,
getting a real on-demand source that would produce an appreciable amount
of photons is hard. On-demand sources that are readily available suffer from
low single photon purity, with g(2)(0) = 0.07. Some heroic efforts have led to
lower g(2)(0), but these sources are too dim, hard to align and keep aligned,
etc.
Nowadays, it is quite common to refer as a “single photon source” to
a source such that g(2)(0) < 0.5. Such an approach, namely, usage of the
coefficient of second order coherence to determine whether a source is of
the single photon type and then, for such sources, to measure the same
coefficient to establish the operational notion of photon, is definitely based
on the argument of the circular type – this is a consequence of the irreducible
self-inconsistency of the quantum theoretic terms, at least of quantum optics.
We can, finally, say that: One has to be well aware that the expression “a
single photon source” is simply jargon used by experimenters. Unfortunately,
by the theoretical part of the quantum community this expression was taken
too straightforward. The usage of the coefficient of second order coherence for
the operational definition of a single photon source (although acceptable op-
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erationally) is totally unacceptable foundationally. The experimental groups
working on problems related to foundations of quantum optics have to put
new efforts to create much better approximations to single photon sources.
Finally, clean experiments to estimate the coefficient of second order interfer-
ence with such on-demand sources and TES-detectors have to be performed.
Such experiments are difficult to perform. And one of the psychological prob-
lems preventing to put essential efforts to such experimental studies is that
there is a very common opinion that the question about the “existence of pho-
ton” has already been totally clarified. This is the wrong viewpoint. There
was done only the easiest part of experimental studies, by using bad sources
and bad detectors, which can be considered as only a preparatory stage for
future real foundational studies in experimental quantum optics.
8 Non-objectivity from the viewpoint of per-
formativity
Let us recall that the Kolmogorov’s main assumption in probability theory
is that there exists a set partition into disjoint subsets and, respectively,
the probability measure defined on the given set is calculated as the addi-
tion of appropriate probabilities defined on subsets. However, we have just
exemplified in the previous sections that there are observables, where the
additivity for probabilities is falsified if we deal with behaviors of quanta,
living organisms, etc.
The intuition of objectivity that has been felt by the majority of physicists
since the Ancient times till now was first formulated by Aristotle. Accord-
ing to him, there is ‘hypokeimenon’ as substratum of any predicates. Hy-
pokeimenon is a family of singular events or singular facts (‘atoms’ in the first
meaning proposed by Democritus). For quantum physicists, hypokeimenon
is given by smallest particles and all the world is described by predicates in
relation to these particles, like that: ‘the quantum has the property A’, ‘the
complex B of quanta has properties Ax, Ay, Az, . . . , which explore physical
phenomena x, y, z, . . . , respectively’, . . . , etc. By Kolmogorov, probabili-
ties should be involved in our reasoning just on particles (singular events)
or their Boolean compositions. However, the double-slit experiment means
that photons cannot be considered the Aristotelian hypokeimenon and there
are no singular events at all.
According to Aristotle, hypokeimenon, the ‘first subject’, underlying things
a, b, c, . . . , present an objective reality. Every underlying thing possesses
unique properties. It means that a, b, c, . . . are atoms of our database. There
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is nothing less than them. Due to properties, we can group atoms within dif-
ferent classes P , Q, R, . . . The more general property of thing, the more
extensive class to which it belongs by this property.
Hence, the idea of hypokeimenon, the underlying things, allowed Aristotle
to build up formal databases as well-founded trees of data (i.e., these trees are
finite and without cycles or loops). He started with underlying things as pri-
mary descendants of trees in constructing ontological (syllogistic) databases.
Let us notice that, by Aristotle, different sciences have different syllogistic
databases, because they use different means for obtaining predicates for hy-
pokeimenon. The quantum physics follows this Aristotelian understanding of
objectivity and differs from the Ancient physics only by different ways of cre-
ating predicates for underlying things which are understood now as smallest
particles.
Syllogistic trees contain genus-species relations among items. We know
that in genus-species relations we can consider a branch (a relation between a
genus and species) as implication, where the top of branch (genus) is regarded
as consequent of implication and the bottom of branch (species) as antecedent
of implication. Then for each node of the genera-species tree, we may define
an intension as all reachable genera (all higher nodes) and an extent as all
reachable species (all lower nodes). It is known that the greater extent, the
smaller intension and the greater intension, the smaller extent.
Thus, the first logical database was invented by Aristotle. It is designed
in his syllogistics. He suggested using this database as a logical frame for
different sciences. Therefore if we claim that a science is a database con-
structed on the basis of empirical observations by applying logical inference
rules, then we can claim that the history of exact science has started since
Aristotle.
Let us assume that such a database is closed under all logical operations.
Then in this database the following relations take place. Let P be a property.
Then there is also a property non-P. Further let P be more extensive than
Q (i.e. an appropriate class P is more extensive, than Q). Then we obtain
the following relations (see figure 1):
• Q and non-P are properties which can be together false, but they can-
not be together true in relation to any atom of our database;
• P and non-Q are properties which can be together true, but cannot be
together false in relation to any atom of our database;
• P and non-P are properties which cannot be together true and cannot
be together false in relation to any atom of our database;
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Figure 1: The Aristotelian square of oppositions.
• Q and non-Q are properties which cannot be together true and cannot
be together false in relation to any atom of our database;
• if Q is true in relation to some atoms of our database, then also P is
true in relation to the same atoms of our database;
• if P is not true in relation to some atoms of our database, then also Q
is not true in relation to the same atoms of our database.
Thus, in the Aristotelian database we deal with the Boolean algebra due
to the assumption of existence of logical atoms (singular events). Since
Aristotle the objectivity has been understood as a possibility to construct
databases when there is ‘subject’, the underlying things, the family of atoms
grouped in classes, so that these classes are closed under all logical opera-
tions. In different sciences we choose different properties of atoms and as
a consequence we group atoms differently. Such an intuition of objectivity
holds in quantum physics till now.
Notably, classical mechanics (CM) can be readily presented as a seman-
tics for the Aristotelian logic closed over logical superpositions of syllogistic
propositions of the following kind: “All S are P”, “Some S are P”, “No S
are P”, “Some S are not P”. The point is that in CM, first, we have Aris-
totelian atoms or individuals defined as particles, second, in CM the state
of a system S consisting of N particles is defined by giving the 3N position
coordinates and the 3N momentum coordinates. Hence, according to CM,
any state of S is fully determined by three values for position and three val-
ues for momentum of all particles of S. This two circumstances allow us to
define a verification of syllogistic propositions as follows:
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SaP : “All particles of S with positions S have momentums P” means that
the system S is not empty (i.e., it contains some particles) and for all
particles of S if we know their position S, then we know their momen-
tum P ;
SiP : “Some particles of S with positions S have momentums P” means that
for some particles of the system S we know their position S and we
know their momentum P ;
SeP : “No particles of S with positions S have momentums P” means that
for all particles of the system S we do not know their position S or we
do not know their momentum P ;
SoP : “Some particles of S with positions S do not have momentums P”
means that all particles do not belong to the system S or there are
particles of S such that we know their position S and we do not know
their momentum P .
Formally:
SaP := (∃A(AεS) ∧ ∀A(AεS ⇒ AεP )); (1)
SiP := ∃A(AεS ∧ AεP ); (2)
SeP := ¬(SiP ); (3)
SoP := ¬(SaP ). (4)
All other propositions of Aristotelian logic are defined thus: (i) each syllogis-
tic proposition defined in (1)–(4) is a proposition, (ii) ifX, Y are propositions,
then ¬X , ¬Y , X ⋆ Y , where ⋆ ∈ {∨,∧,⇒}, are propositions, too. Now, the
Aristotelian logic can describe properties of our knowledge on systems S of
CM.
Nevertheless, we can assume reality without objectivity, i.e., without
atoms of databases. In modern logic universes in which there are no atoms
are studied as well. However, in modern sciences the intuition that logi-
cal atoms exist has been used till now, and Aristotle’s reasoning has been
intuitively applied.
Notice that any context-based reasoning can be realized only in a universe
without atoms. For instance, let us consider the following two propositions
from the Bible: ‘bestow that money for sheep’ and ‘bestow for whatsoever
thy soul desireth’ (Deut. 14:26). Syntactically, if we assume the existence of
logical atoms, ‘bestow for whatsoever thy soul desireth’ is a universal affir-
mative proposition (SaP ) and ‘bestow that money for sheep’ is a particular
affirmative proposition (SiP ), i.e., the first is more general, than the second.
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Figure 2: The unconventional square of oppositions.
However, for example, I do not desire sheep and I do not know people who
desire it. Perhaps, such people exist, but I do not know. Then we cannot
plot the classical square (figure 1), because ‘bestow that money for sheep’ is
not included into ‘bestow for whatsoever thy soul desireth’, e.g., maybe my
soul does not desire sheep, but desire many other things. The matter is that
‘thy soul desireth’ is a performative proposition and it has different meanings
at different situations (there are no atoms for that proposition). This means
that in this Biblical example the implication SaP ⇒ SiP is false in general
case. Thence, we could assume another semantics, where SaP and SiP are
different viewpoints of the same level. Therefore, at one and the same situa-
tion of utterance both statements (‘bestow for whatsoever thy soul desireth’,
SaP , and ‘bestow that money for sheep’, SiP ) may be simultaneously false,
but cannot be simultaneously true. In this way we obtain the unconventional
square of opposition (figure 2).
The same situation takes place for photons and other quanta. The logical
square of figure 1 does not hold for them, because logical atoms do not exist
for all situations (for the double-slit experiment when both slits are open).
Let us consider the propositions ‘the photon can be detected passing through
all slits’ (SaP ), ‘the photon cannot be detected passing through the slits’
(SeP ), ‘the photon can be detected passing through some slits (probably
through the one slit)’ (SiP ), ‘the photon cannot be detected passing through
some slits (probably through the one slit)’ (SoP ). If it is possible to say that
the following implication is valid: if ‘the photon can be detected passing
through all slits’, then ‘the photon can be detected passing through some
slits (probably through the one slit)’? In other words, if the photon is a
wave and described in a proposition in theoretical terms of ‘wave’, then the
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same photon is a particle and described in another proposition in theoretical
terms of ‘particle’? Rather there should be the disjunction: SaP or SiP .
But not implication. Indeed, if SaP is true, then the photon is not a particle
in common meaning, and if SiP is true, then maybe the photon is a particle
in common meaning.
In QM, it is impossible to define logical atoms. Indeed, if there were logi-
cal atoms in QM, our propositions would not be performative and would not
depend upon the context of quantum experiments. It means that the reality
exists, but it does not correspond to the Aristotelian intuition of objectivity
when the underlying things exist, i.e., any behavior is reduced to an indi-
vidual behavior. Instead of this intuition, we can propose another intuition,
the non-well-funded objectivity [25], when there are no logical atoms, i.e.,
there is no ‘first subject’ in the Aristotelian meaning. We can add that in
our picture of the world there are no things themselves (‘Dinge an sich’ in
the Kantian meaning), nothing, only behavioral complexes described by self-
referent performative propositions. It is a kind of idealism proposed in the
linguistic solipsism of Wittgenstein and accepted by us. A similar idealistic
approach was proposed by E. Husserl. He states that phenomena are noth-
ing more than our consciousness, and pure phenomenology is the science of
pure consciousness: “Natural objects, for example, must be experienced before
any theorizing about them can occur. Experiencing is consciousness that intuits
something and values it to be actual; experiencing is intrinsically characterized as
consciousness of the natural object in question and of it as the original: there is
consciousness of the original as being there ‘in person’ ” [46]. Thus, “the concept
‘phenomenon’ carries over, furthermore, to the changing modes of being conscious
of something – for example, the clear and the obscure, evident and blind modes
in which one and the same relation or connection, one and the same state of af-
fairs, one and the same logical coherency, etc., can be given to consciousness” [46].
Notice that Gestalt psychology is based on these ideas of Husserl.
Thus, in non-well-founded objectivity there are no logical atoms. What
does it mean? We have properties (classes) P , Q, R, . . . Some of these
classes have non-empty intersections, and some others do not. Logical atoms
are classes which cannot be intersected at all, they are singletons. Their
intersection is always empty. This fact can be considered the definition of
logical atom. Their logical combination (disjunction, conjunction, comple-
ment) gives any class P , Q, R, . . . Accordingly, the universe in which there
are no logical atoms is universe in which the intersection of classes is not
empty. Different combinations of these intersections give different contexts
of performative propositions. For such a universe instead of the Aristotelian
square of opposition (figure 1), another square takes place (figure 2), e.g.,
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• In the double-slit experiment with photons :
‘The photon can be detected in all slits’ (SaP ), ‘the photon can be
detected in no slits’ (SeP ), ‘the photon can be detected in some slits
(in QM, it means, just in one)’ (SiP ), ‘the photon cannot be detected
in some slits (just in one)’ (SoP ).
• Formally :
1. SaP and SiP are properties which can be together unjustified, but
they cannot be together justified in relation to any performative
situation of our database;
2. SeP and SoP are properties which can be together justified, but
cannot be together unjustified in relation to any performative sit-
uation of our database;
3. SaP and SoP are properties which cannot be together justified
and cannot be together unjustified in relation to any performative
situation of our database;
4. SeP and SiP are properties which cannot be together justified
and cannot be together unjustified in relation to any performative
situation of our database;
5. if SaP (respectively, SiP ) is justified in relation to some performa-
tive situations of our database, then also SeP (respectively, SoP )
is justified in relation to the same situations of our database8;
6. if SeP (respectively, SoP ) is not justified in relation to some
performative situations of our database, then also SaP (respec-
tively, SiP ) is not justified in relation to the same situations of
our database.
Notice that in our version of QL, performative propositions expressing
observables are not true or false in a conventional meaning of Russellian-
Tarskian semantics, but they are justified or unjustified. Really, they have a
8We should remark that in logic, the implication does not mean a causal relation or
deep semantic relationship between antecedent and consequent. For example, the sentence
“2+2=4” implies that “We are born in the USSR”, because both sentences are true. In case
of syllogistic, we group quantified propositions into some classes according to their truth-
conditions. So, this relationship between antecedent and consequent just formally follows
from our formal definitions of SaP , SeP , SiP , SoP , see (5)–(8) and their interpretations
on quantum observables below. In an informal interpretation, this relationship between
antecedent and consequent means that the class of events of non-detecting in both slits is
largest. The class of detecting in one slit or in both slits is smallest. It directly follows
from our formal definitions below.
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pragmatic rather than a semantic interpretation. In the Austian semantics
(also called the situation semantics), they are evaluated as successful or un-
successful in the given situation of utterances. We use some its versions in
our logic of self-referent performative propositions.
So, instead of atoms in the quantum universe we deal with performative
situations, i.e., with different intersections of classes (properties) in a collec-
tive behavior. The logical theory of performative propositions was proposed
in [16], [17]. In this theory we obtain non-well-founded syllogistic trees for
which there cannot be underlying things (hypokeimenon). Thus, there is no
objectivity in classical meaning. Indeed, we can always define intersections
A&B for some situations A and B such that A&B is an infimum of A and B.
Therefore there are no atoms which can be used for building trees-molecules
as their superpositions. Instead of underlying things, we suppose situations
that can always be intersected.
The Aristotelian logic with syllogistic propositions defined in (1)–(4) is
self-inconsistent on quantum observables, although CM plays the role of
semantics for this logic, as we said. Nevertheless, we can offer a non-
Aristotelian system without logical atoms, where syllogistic propositions have
the following meanings:
SaP : “All quanta of S with positions S have momentums P” means that
the system S is not empty (i.e., it contains some quanta) and for all
experiments with quanta of S their position S is absolutely uncertain
for all possibilities and we know their momentum P ; in the double-
slit experiment : the system S is not empty and for all experiments
with quanta of S these quanta pass through both slits (S) and their
momentum has an interference picture (P );
SiP : “Some quanta of S with positions S have momentums P” means that
for all quanta of the system S we know their position S and we do
not know their momentum P ; in the double-slit experiment : for all
experiments with quanta of S these quanta pass through one slit (S)
and their momentum does not have an interference picture (P );
SeP : “No quanta of S with positions S have momentums P” is justified
iff “Some quanta of S with positions S have momentums P” is not
justified;
SoP : “Some quanta of S with positions S do not have momentums P” is
justified iff “All quanta of S with positions S have momentums P” is
not justified.
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Formally:
SaP := (∃A(AεS) ∧ ∀A(AεS ∧AεP )); (5)
SiP := ∀A(¬(AεS) ∧ ¬(AεP )); (6)
SeP := ¬(SiP ); (7)
SoP := ¬(SaP ). (8)
All other propositions of non-Aristotelian quantum logic are defined as fol-
lows: (i) each syllogistic proposition defined in (5)–(8) is a proposition, (ii)
if X, Y are propositions, then ¬X , ¬Y , X ⋆ Y , where ⋆ ∈ {∨,∧,⇒}, are
propositions, also. This non-Aristotelian logic is a very simple version of
QL without logical atoms. All its propositions are performative and depend
upon contexts.
Hence, we could claim that: From the viewpoint of performativity and
logical theories studying performative propositions, there is no objective real-
ity in the classical (Aristotelian) meaning. In QM, scientists try to appeal
to the objective reality with logical atoms of quantum systems, which causes
self-inconsistencies. Therefore, the only outcome is in appealing to non-well-
founded reality [25] and performative propositions in QM. Self-inconsistency
occurs only in cases of applying classical logic and classical semantics. In our
logic, there are no contradictions. The same situation is in the so-called para-
consistent logics, where there are contradictions as new truth-values. Self-
inconsistency is just in that we avoid logical atoms and even contrary state-
ments in the classical logic may have non-empty intersections in our new
semantics. Thus, the term self-inconsistency only concerns logical properties
of our version of QL and not phenomena. Evidently, phenomena themselves
simply occur and cannot be self-inconsistent.
9 Existence of photon from the viewpoint of
heralded photons
Due to applications of ideas of performativity in QM to the problems of sin-
gle photon on demand source (low coefficient of second order coherence, high
brightness, experimental feasibility, etc.), it is possible to propose a workable
solution consisted in heralded photon sources, i.e., sources based on para-
metric down-conversion. These sources produce low levels of classical light
in each of the two conjugated modes, but have a property that photons are
created in pairs: one per conjugated mode, therefore detecting one photon in
one mode means that a photon in the other was created with 100% certainty.
In good experiments it is possible to collect up to 70% of these heralded
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photons. We therefore write that conditional P (detection1|emission2) = 0.7,
where 1,2 are the mode numbers. Similarly, g
(2)
conditional(0) = 0.01.
One can think of such a source as a source of pulsed “single photons”,
where one learns about the presence of a good single photon (with Pregister =
0.7 per pulse) by seeing a click in the other mode. Most of experimenters use
these sources and call them single photon sources. This substitution may be
justified from the operational viewpoint, but it makes a big difference from
the foundational viewpoint.
From the viewpoint of self-(in)consistency analysis of quantum physical
entities, by using heralded photon sources, the experimenters try to mini-
mize self-inconsistency by considering conditioned events. This is the crucial
departure from the original event structure of the quantum formalism which
is based on the assumption of the existence of individual quantum systems
and uses the event algebra (in fact, Boolean) to describe measurements of
a single observable on such systems. Moreover, 30% of unused pairs also
destroys consistency of the event structure of the yes-no experiments, i.e., we
can claim that there is no Aristotelian objectivity with logical atoms.
Finally, we emphasize that, although the value g
(2)
conditional = 0.01 is rela-
tively small, the number of coincidence clicks is still non-negligible. Hence,
we can repeat considerations of section 6 and derive non-objectivity of pho-
tonic observables from self-inconsistency of theoretic entities on observables.
Here, the probability of coincidence also has nonzero low bound which, of
course, depends on the experimental setup. It depends on so many “techni-
calities” that its calculation is really a nontrivial task. First and foremost,
one needs to know the number of pairs generated per second. One can expect
that g(2)(0) is higher for brighter states, and lower for dimmer states. Losses
in both heralding and experimental channel are also important as well as
properties of down-conversion. If one operates with a single mode source,
the noise photons would have thermal, and not Poisson statistics. If one had
a low mode number, statistics would be a finite sum of thermal states, and if
one had infinite number of modes (broad background), then the background
would become Poissonian. Hence a g(2)(0)-value would range by a factor of
2 (single mode thermal state vs pure Poisson) for the same µ, where the
latter is the average number of photons per pulse. And – sure enough –
in the presence of technicalities, such as loss, jitter and uncorrelated noise,
exposure time (time window) would matter.
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10 Self-inconsistency of dichotomous quan-
tum observables in the light of random
field model of quantum phenomena
It is obvious that one can ignore our analysis of self-consistency of quantum
phenomena by regarding the problem of the coincidence clicks as a purely
technical problem of the elimination of noise, i.e., having no fundamental
value. This problem can have a fundamental value only under the assumption
that this problem cannot in principle be solved by improving technologies
for “single photon” sources and detectors. Such an assumption cannot be
justified within QM. However, there are some logical reasons supporting this
assumption (sections 7, 8). In particular, one can present some motivations
for it by going beyond the quantum formalism and considering prequantum
(classical probabilistic) models reproducing quantum probabilities. The first
reaction to such a comment would be that, as a consequence of various no-go
theorems, such prequantum models do not exist or if they exist, they have
to be nonlocal as, e.g., Bohmian mechanics. According to Einstein, we reject
such an ambiguous notion as nonlocal realism. Therefore, we discuss only
local prequantum models. Of course, such models have to be nonrealistic
in the Bell’s sense, i.e., non-objective in our terminology. We remark that
Bell’s terminology “realism” in connection to the problem of hidden variables
is a bit ambiguous. He definitely discusses realism of quantum observables
expressed in terms of hidden variables. However, realism can be recovered on
the level of hidden variables, if quantum observables are not expressible in
terms of such additional variables. The notion of (non)objectivity is related
only to quantum observables.
Thus, we want to discuss a non-objective model with hidden variables.
The key point is that such a model will be self-inconsistent at the level of
measurements formulated in the yes-no logics and the Aristotelian hypothesis
of objectivity constructed on logical atoms. In spite such features as non-
objectivity and self-referentiality which are “pathological” in classical world,
our model is very natural. In fact, there is nothing more natural if one
wants to arrive to quantum physics by departing from classical theory. Non-
objectivity in the Aristotelian meaning and self-referentiality on the level of
observations are strange only for classical mechanics of particles. And we
consider waves, instead of particles. This approach was originally explored
by Schro¨dinger, but later he gave up. We were able to resolve the problems
which pressed Schro¨dinger to accept the probabilistic interpretation of the
wave function (due to Max Born); in particular, the problem of the wave
modelling of composite systems.
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In short, in our model which is known under the name prequantum clas-
sical statistical field theory (PCSFT) [53]–[61] quantum systems are symbolic
representations of classical random fields fluctuating at time and space scales
which are essentially finer than quantum labs scales. Such fields by inter-
acting with detectors of the threshold type produce clicks. These clicks are
interpreted as quantum events.
In PCSFT, the irradiance of a beam of light is only an indication of its
average state. If we could magnify local states, we should see a little bit of
chaos. At some points, the amplitude of the waves is well below the average,
and at others we get arbitrarily high spikes. In short, the field is “clumpy”
at the microscopic level.
Suppose that we have a point-like detector. When the field crosses the
plane of detection, it might happen that the local amplitude is close to av-
erage or lower. No detection is possible. It can also happen that we have an
amplitude spike followed by several small crests. Again, the signal does not
accumulate above the threshold and nothing happens. Yet, there is a real
probability that an amplitude spike will continue over several cycles. In this
case, sustained resonance above the threshold will result in a detection click.
Consequently, the pattern of detection is produced by the low probability of
transient “spikes” in a continuous field. It is not true that we have single
discrete entities at the moment and point of detection.
At the level of such events, PCSFT is fundamentally self-inconsistent.
The probability of a coincidence click, i.e., matching of two trains of spikes (at
the micro-scale) at two detectors is nonzero, even theoretically. It decreases
with increase of the threshold, but even for very high threshold a random
field can produce matching spikes.
Moreover, one cannot violate Bell’s inequality and more generally to rep-
resent quantum compound systems in entangled states by considering ran-
dom fields propagating in vacuum (at least in our model). One has to con-
sider a random background field which is present everywhere (one may call
it zero point field or vacuum fluctuations). This (classical) field contributes
into correlations and, in particular, its presence gives a possibility to violate
Bell’s inequality. This field has the random structure which similar to the
one of random fields-signals representing quantum systems. Hence, a thresh-
old detector “eats” energy of combined spikes, signals combined with the
background field.
Non-objectivity of such observables on random fields is a consequence of
self-referentiality, the impossibility in general to assign say polarization up or
down. As a consequence of the presence of the random background field con-
tributing irreducibly into threshold detection, the coincidence clicks appear
irrespectively to our manipulations with random field-signals representing
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quantum systems.
11 Conclusion
Following Bohr, von Weizsa¨cker, Brukner, and Zeilinger, we have analyzed
the problem of inconsistency between classical language description of theo-
retical quantum phenomena based on Aristotelian-Russellian logics and ex-
perimental structure of these phenomena which is exhibited first of all in the
complementary structure of quantum experiments (so-called “wave-particle
duality”). We have presented this problem in very general context of lin-
guistic solipsism (Wittgenstein, Searle, and Austin) by emphasizing the role
of performative propositions in scientific theories and, in particular, in QM.
Such propositions are in general self-referent; attempts to use them in com-
bination with Aristotelian-Russellian logics leads to inconsistency. We have
argued that, nevertheless, it is possible to escape logical self-inconsistency
of quantum performativity by appealing to the approach based on non-well-
founded reality [25] (as opposed to the approach based on the objective re-
ality).
In this paper, we pointed out that the problem of self-inconsistency of
QM is even deeper than self-inconsistency implied by the principle of com-
plementarity. The latter (see presentation of views of Brukner and Zeilinger
in the Introduction) implies that, for a quantum system S, it is impossible
to assign consistently the truth values to all propositions about this systems.
We found that even the statement about existence of a quantum system
cannot be peacefully embedded in Aristotelian-Russellian logics. Our ar-
gument is based on the analysis of the experiment on “photon existence”,
measurement of the coefficient of second order coherence. If positivity of this
coefficient for experiments with the “single photon state” is interpreted as a
foundational issue (and not just as a problem of noise and the state prepa-
ration), then the operational definition of photon as detector’s click leads to
self-inconsistency of QM, self-inconsistency of coupling between the notions
of QM as a theoretical formalism and the real experimental situation.
We also stressed the similarity between quantum mechanical and biologi-
cal phenomena. Both are characterized by descriptions based on performative
propositions and they are self-inconsistent in the framework of Aristotelian-
Russellian logics. Our discussion on biological systems is restricted to perfor-
mativity related to the principle of complementarity, impossibility to assign
consistently the truth values to all propositions about actions of a biological
system.
An important part of our consideration was about the role of experi-
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menter’s free will in resolving (at least partially) self-inconsistency of QM;
we have pointed to the performative nature of statements related to “exper-
imental technicalities” such as, e.g., the discrimination threshold and time
window. We have also analyzed the possibility to resolve self-inconsistency
of QM by going “beyond quantum”. So, we have considered a model of
the classical field type reproducing the basic predictions of QM, the so-called
prequantum classical statistical field theory (PCSFT). By PCSFT objectives,
reality can be recovered at the subquantum level, in spite of non-objectivity
of “reality at the quantum level.”
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